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ABSTRACT 
African countries tend to be affected by global agricultural policies in the same 
way as other economies but with much more severe economy-wide repercussions.  Most 
African countries find themselves at the lower end of the economic growth process, 
which implies a much greater dependence of overall economic growth on domestic 
demand, agricultural incomes, and agricultural trade.  They tend to be characterized by a 
higher degree of trade openness, increasing dependency on food imports, heavy reliance 
on agricultural exports for foreign exchange earnings, and lower absorption capacities of 
global market shocks.  These features do not only make African economies more 
vulnerable to distortions and changes in global trading policies in the agricultural sector.  
They would also determine the implications of agricultural trade liberalization among 
African countries.  The present discussion paper 1) examines the vulnerability of Africa 
economies with respect to global agricultural trading policies and their induced changes 
in world agricultural markets, based on the above characteristics; 2) analyzes the 
efficiency effects within Africa’s agricultural sector of world market distortions resulting 
from agricultural trading policies; 3) illustrates the impact of global protectionism on 
poverty levels and distribution among rural households in Africa and the implication for 
the objective of poverty reduction; 4)  reviews the options and risks facing African 
countries in their pursuit of opportunities for greater participation in the global trading 
system, in particular in connection with the Doha trade agenda; and 5) discusses options 
for global trade liberalization that would best benefit African economies. 
The paper argues that the insistence on the part of African countries on Special 
and Differential Treatment entails much more risks than benefits for their economies.  It 
also indicates that trade preferences have been less beneficial to African economies than 
usually assumed and at any rate have not been significant enough to compensate African 
countries for the negative impact of global protectionism.  Finally, the paper also 
disagrees with the widely accepted conclusion that African countries would suffer from 
liberalization of global agricultural policies because they tend to be net food importers.  
That conclusion does not sufficiently take into consideration the dynamic long term   viii
effects of global policy changes on production and trading patterns among African 
countries and the potential efficiency effects that would emanate there from. 
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Global agricultural policies similarly affect many economies, but may have more 
severe economy-wide consequences in Africa.  Most African countries find themselves at 
the lower spectrum of the economic development process, which implies a greater 
dependence on domestic demand, agricultural incomes, and agricultural trade to achieve 
overall economic growth.  In addition, the structure of domestic production and export 
sectors, the level of capacities to absorb economic shocks, and the historically outward-
oriented nature of the economies all combined constitute distinguishing characteristics of 
African countries at present.  These features do not only make African economies more 
vulnerable to distortions and changes in global trading policies in the agricultural sector.  
They also determine the implications of agricultural trade liberalization among African 
countries.   
The first section of the paper discusses relevant features of African economies and 
examines the resulting vulnerability with respect to global agricultural trading policies 
and their induced changes in world agricultural markets.  The second section presents 
some of the key outcomes of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture and their 
implications for African agriculture. It also highlights lessons learned and future global 
trade policy challenges and options facing African countries.  The final section of the 
paper looks at the ongoing agricultural trade negotiations, identifies potential risks for 
African countries, and discusses options for global trade liberalization that would best 
benefit African economies. 
The paper will argue that trade preferences have not been beneficial to African 
economies, have not compensated them for the negative impact of global protectionism, 
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and are unlikely to do either in the future.  Moreover, it will show that the insistence on 
the part of African countries on Special and Differential Treatment entails much more 
risks than benefits for their economies.  The paper will also disagree with the widely 
accepted conclusion that African countries would suffer from liberalization of global 
agricultural policies because they tend to be net food importers.  That conclusion does not 
sufficiently take into consideration the dynamic long term effects of global policy 
changes on production and trading patterns among African countries and the potential 
efficiency effects that would emanate there from. 
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II.  RELEVANT FEATURES OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES 
Long before the debate about economic openness has occupied the center of the 
post-structural adjustment growth and development agenda, economists have stressed the 
critical link between overall trade, economic development, and growth performance in 
the agriculture sector in the early stages of the development process
2.  The growth 
literature of the 1960s and 1970s, in particular, emphasized the importance of domestic 
demand for the growth process.  Its findings suggest that: “a minimum threshold of 
development is needed before export growth and economic growth are associated” 
(Heller and Porter, 1978; p. 192), and that the weak relationship between the two in the 
early period of development is due to the “relatively low level of manufactured exports in 
several countries” (Balassa, 1978; p. 183). Furthermore, the analysis of the relative 
contributions of domestic and foreign demand to economic growth by Urata (1989) 
shows a much stronger contribution of domestic absorption at lower levels of economic 
development.   A key conclusion from the above is that, at lower levels of development, 
the stimulus for structural transformation and growth must come from internal demand, 
which in turn, is fueled by growth in the agricultural sector.   
The crucial role of agricultural growth as a stimulus to the process of overall 
growth has also been documented in micro-level studies. For instance, in their study of 
small enterprises in several African countries, Liedholm et al (1994) found that 
differences in local agricultural growth were the most important determinants in 
explaining the differences in enterprise start up rates and expansion, as well as in 
employment creation in the studied zones.  Similarly, a study by Delgado et al (1998) on 
growth linkages within the local economy in a sample of African countries estimated 
growth multipliers that are much larger than previously thought and fully comparable to 
estimates in the Asian literature. The estimates obtained in their study show that adding 
                                                 
2 See Jonhston and Mellor (1961); Lewis (1954); Michaely (1977), Heller and Porter (1978), Balassa 
(1978). More recent work on the link between trade, economic growth, and poverty can be found in Dollar 
and Kraay (2004); Winters (2002); Winters (2004); and Winters et al (2004). 
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one dollar to farm tradable income could increase total income by 2 to 3 dollars.  In other 
words, a sustained expansion of revenues from agricultural tradables would result in an 
increase in overall incomes in the local economy that is at least twice as high as the initial 
increase of incomes in the agricultural sector itself.   
Globalization has introduced a significant change in the growth dynamics implied 
above.  Falling transport costs, development in international finance, higher levels of 
trade exchange with the rest of the world, greater degree of openness of domestic 
economies, have together gradually reduced the dominant role of domestic demand in 
stimulating structural transformation and growth.   These factors explain why Africa’s 
situation today is very different from that of Asia in the 1950s and 1960s.  The greater 
role of internal demand combined with lower levels of external competition in domestic 
markets in Asia during that period meant that supply-raising agricultural technology 
advances could go a long way towards meeting part of the growth challenge.  This, in 
principle, explains the extent of the success and impact of the green revolution.  African 
countries find themselves today in a different situation.  Globalization and its associated 
factors listed above mean that advances on the supply side are more intricately linked to 
factors on the demand side.  African countries do not only have to produce more, they 
also have to “sell” better in far more competitive domestic as well as external martkets in 
order to raise supplies.  The agricultural sector still operates as a crucial stimulant of 
structural transformation and growth.  However, the growth of the sector itself depends 
on factors outside the domestic economy and the supply-side sphere.  Among the major 
factors affecting agricultural and overall growth among African countries are global 
protectionism and its associated policies, including explicit and implicit export subsidies 
and dumping.  
In sum, the vulnerability of African countries with respect to global policies and 
the trade liberalization agenda arises from characteristics inherent to their economies 
such as: strong dependence on agriculture for income, employment, and foreign exchange 
earnings; low shock absorption capacity at national as well as household levels; heavy 
dependence on food imports; and relatively high degree of sector openness.  These  
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conditions render African economies particularly vulnerable to trends and instability 
levels of world agricultural prices, long term changes with respect to access barriers to 
export markets, and global policies affecting the competitiveness of imports in domestic 
markets across Africa.  They also determine the cost to African countries of current 
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III.  AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND GLOBAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION: 
LESSONS FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE 
The Agreement on Agriculture has not Adequately Addressed Africa’s Needs 
The objective here is to review the outcomes from the past trade negotiation 
round and their impact on African countries as a first step towards examining the 
opportunities and risks facing them under the Doha agenda.  There is now a consensus 
that the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) has not led to any significant reform of global 
agricultural policies.  In fact, a closer look at the evidence would reveal a marked 
deterioration in several areas.  Figures 1 and 2 below summarize trends in overall support 
to agriculture, price protection, and export subsidies among Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.  It is clear from the different graphs 
that since 1994 supports to agriculture, as well as the level of protection as measured by 
the ratio of farm gate prices attributable to border protection have actually grown.    
Figure 1.  Trends in OECD Policies 
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Moreover, the use of price as a main instrument of support is still widespread. 
Both in the US and EU, the extent of price support and its share in total producer support 
have increased again after the mid-1990s.  To be sure, they remained lower than in the 
base years 1986-88.  As is well known and documented, that base period was a real 
outlier and by selecting it, opportunity was provided to weaken the agreement.  High 
levels of protection and support are also prevalent among developing countries, as 
documented in Anderson et al (2005) and Bouet et al (2005).   
In the case of African countries, the graphs show that African exports indeed face 
import taxes in all regions and that these taxes can be quite high for some exports.  At the 
same time, exports to African countries continue to be heavily subsidized. 
While it is true that African countries enjoy considerable preferences, in particular 
when exporting to the EU, the increase in global protection and continued use of price as 
an instrument of support mean that the associated distortionary implications for world 
markets in terms of price levels, structure, and stability, have remained if not amplified.  
These effects are transmitted directly into African economies and shape the environment 
for production and consumption in these countries.  The ramifications emanating 
thereform affect the performance of the agricultural sector in Africa.   The situation is 
being further complicated for African countries by the emergence of increasingly 
complex norms and standards and other types of non-tariff barriers.  Jaffee and Henson 
(2005) and Wilson (2002) illustrate the considerable challenge facing African countries 
with respect to complying with the quality requirements for agricultural exports.    
Preferences May Not Be Working 
It is often stated in the literature that African countries would lose from further 
liberalization of global policies given that they are already enjoying preferences that 
would be greatly eroded by further tariff reduction. This could have been true if the 
preferences were working. However, a closer look at the evidence reveals that, for 
whatever reason, the preferential treatments may not be working.   An extensive analysis 
of the effects of preferences on agricultural exports by African countries has been carried  
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out by Brenton and Ikezuki (2005).  The graph in the top right-hand side corner of Figure 
2 is based on their results.  It shows the benefit of current preferences by the EU, Japan, 
and US to African countries.   For that purpose, the value of preferences is expressed in 
terms of the share in the total exports of individual preference receiving countries.  The 
countries are then regrouped in three different groupings depending on whether the value 
of preferences is less than 1 percent of exports or contained within the 1-5 or 5-20 percent 
ranges.  In the graph, the bars represent the number of preference receiving African 
countries which fall within each of the 3 groups.  For the great majority of African 
countries, the value of preferences is no more than a small percentage of their exports.  
The value of preferences granted by the US and Japan, for instance, is less than 1% of 
exports for about 80 percent of African countries.   Preference benefits are highest for 
exports to the EU, where more than half of African countries have values ranging 
between 5 and 20 percent.    
Figure 2.  Subsidies and Preferences 
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African countries are frequently blamed for failing to exploit these preferences.  
There may be a multitude of reasons why the value of preferences have been so low, 
many of them in fact linked to the global trading policy environment, the impact of which 
preferences seek to mitigate.   These would include: (i) the longstanding pressure on 
international agricultural prices due to the rapid expansion of subsidized production in 
OECD countries over the last four decades; (ii) the increasing instability of world market 
prices due to the protection and isolation of domestic markets in an increasing number of 
countries since the 1960s, and (iii) the degree of distortions that has been introduced into 
world agricultural markets following decades of intervention in the agricultural sector by 
dominant trading partners.  The agricultural sector in African countries is widely exposed 
to these developments, which have negatively affected its performance.  Furthermore, 
Africa’s agriculture has been constantly besieged by heavily subsidized exports from a 
host of sources, not only OECD countries, as shown in the top left hand side graph of 
Figure 2.  The recent debates around the Doha round have highlighted the case of the 
cotton sector in West Africa, which is just the latest and perhaps more prominent sector 
to have fallen victim to global protectionism.  A closer examination would reveal similar 
ramifications in other regions in Africa and sectors, including oilseeds, dairy, cereals, 
beef, and recently poultry.   
Demonstrative Effects of Global Protectionism Undermine Preferences 
No one can deny the considerable harm that countries’ own sectoral policies have 
done to agriculture in the past.  Despite nearly a decade of reforms, detrimental policies 
still prevail in many African countries.  Although not necessary motivated by policy 
intervention in the North, African governments currently justify distortionary sector 
policies by pointing to policy regimes in OECD countries, as they have done since the 
start of the structural-adjustment related policy reforms of the 1980s.  More importantly, 
agricultural and agribusiness interest groups more frequently ask their governments to  
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simply copy the North
3.  Recent development in the cotton sector in West Africa can 
again be cited here as example.  Until the recent collapse of world cotton prices, 
momentum was gathering to address the institutional and policy weaknesses in the sector.  
Significant progress was made in the policy debate across the region and some consensus 
was emerging about the need to reform the sector and create more transparency, greater 
efficiency, and increased participation of farmer organizations in decision making and 
management.   When the world cotton market crisis hit, all the attention was suddenly 
turned towards subsidies and other support policies in other major exporting and/or 
producing countries and away from the considerable problems that were threatening long 
term viability of the sector from within.  It was not the first time that cotton prices 
collapsed, nor were the policies in competing countries being discovered for the first 
time.  A major factor in the immediate and forceful response among West African 
governments to the fall in cotton prices has been its timing.   The debate about reforms 
was at its highest level of intensity and the pressure to move and reform was mounting.   
It was clear to many actors involved that difficult decisions lied ahead.   The crisis was 
therefore seen and seized as a welcome opportunity to step back from these decisions.  
The risk and importance of internal institutional and policy deficiencies with respect the 
sector’s long term viability were quickly ignored.  All efforts were now diverted towards 
fighting production and export subsidy policies in competing countries.  The reform 
process was simply put on hold or eventually rolled back.  
A less visible and talked about example happened just recently.  At a Presidential 
Forum organized by an African government and attended by about 10 foreign heads of 
state, the main recommendation was that African countries should erect tariff walls and 
seek to double prices paid to their farmers.   Ironically, the same speakers also 
recommended that African governments ask developed countries to provide the necessary 
financial aid to also double prices of export commodities.   These positions were 
defended by several international keynote speakers.   The reason was that such policies 
                                                 
3  Such demands often target the more distorting and rent-inducing elements of OECD policies than the 
more justifiable interventions such as investments in infrastructure and research, for instance.   
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have succeeded among developed countries.   Although the above arguments are 
untenable and the recommendations certain to never be implemented, they were received 
with amazing support by the audience.  The broad support among the audience highlights 
one of the many problems associated with the protectionist policy regimes of developed 
countries and their demonstrative effects for African as well as other developing 
countries.  These regimes have provided some kind of legitimacy for interventionist 
policies and the continued reluctance to reform them just reinforces the position of those 
who see no evil in them but rather point to the phenomenal increase in output and 
dominant position in international export markets after four decades of massive support 
by developed countries.  They do not bother going through the complex analysis of the 
significant economic losses caused to protecting countries and the high cost imposed on 
the global agricultural systems.    
One can hardly ignore nowadays the fact that global protectionism has emerged as 
a credibility problem for national as well international proponents of further reforms in 
Africa’s agricultural sector.  It has gradually eroded the support for further reforms that 
are necessary to restore growth in African agriculture, as it is increasingly perceived as 
the villain while the exorbitant costs of past domestic policy mistakes are fading in 
people’s memory.   The emerging point of view for an increasing number of stakeholders 
is that, if there is anything wrong with past policies, it is the fact of having reformed or 
abandoned such policies.  The unlikely success of the Doha round in terms of effective 
liberalization of global trade policies would most likely roll back some the important 
sector policy improvement among African countries and hence undermine their capacity 
to exploited future and possibly expanded preferences.  
Demand Erosion, Demand Substitution, and Price Preference 
Preferences basically allow recipient countries to export to preference-granting 
countries at higher prices.   They do not offer protection against export demand erosion 
due to subsidized expansion, in the preference-granted countries, of output in the sectors 
for which preferences are being granted.   Nor do they protect against demand 
substitution, which arises when protection and domestic subsidies boost output of  
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substitute products, which then displace exports in competing sectors.  The case of 
vegetable oil exports to the EU market can be used to illustrate the implications of 
demand substitution.   The bottom left-hand side graph in Figure 2 shows the evolution of 
extra-EU imports of groundnut oil compared to intra-EU imports of sunflower oil, a close 
substitute.  The latter have risen rapidly over the 1960s, and by the end of that decade, 
have surpassed the volume of groundnut oil imports, which from that period onward have 
fallen steadily.  Over the next 30 years, groundnut oil imports into the EU have fallen by 
more than half, from a peak of about 400,000 metric tons (mt) in the early 1970s to less 
than 200,000 mt in 2002.  Intra-EU sunflower oil imports, in contrast, have more than 
doubled to about 1.00 million mt.    
The graph to the right shows the evolution of relative prices during the same 
period.  While the rapidly expanding demand for high value vegetable oil in the EU has 
been captured by EU sunflower oil producers, induced changes in world market price 
ratios between the two products have gradually shifted competitiveness and demand 
outside of the EU in favor of sunflower oil.  Moreover, instability in the groundnut oil 
market increased substantially over the same period, compared to sunflower oil prices, in 
addition to a generalized pressure on world vegetable oil prices.  That pressure resulted 
not only from rising vegetable oil production in the EU but also from the expansion of 
soybean production in countries such as the US and Brazil in order to meet the expanding 
demand for substitute feed in the EU, following the substantial increase in protected 
cereal prices in that market.  The world market was flooded with soybean oil, a by-
product of supplying the EU with soybean meal.  The consequence was not only lower 
export prices for African groundnut oil exporters but also increasing competition in 
domestic and cross-border markets among African countries.  The combination of 
demand erosion/substitution, unfavorable shift in relative prices, generalized price 
decline, and increasing competition in local markets do not only hurt current producers, 
processors, and exporters, they also significantly undermine the incentives for long term 
investment in the sector.  Consequently, the capacity of preference receiving countries to 
fill their quotas is weakened, as is the capacity of new entrant countries to invest in  
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expanding production and exports.  The trends in the graphs in Figure 2 would suggest 
that benefits from preferential access to the EU market would be quite limited, certainly 
much less than African exporters, such as Senegal, would have realized in the absence of 
the policies that induced the substitution in import demand as well as changes in world 
prices and vegetable oil supply.   
The arguments of demand erosion and substitution are often dismissed quite 
hastily on the ground that African countries have often failed to fill their quotas.  The 
counter-argument is weakened by the fact that, like the preferences themselves, the 
capacity of countries to fill their quotas cannot be treated separately from the global 
trading environment and its consequences on production and consumption conditions in 
recipient countries.  The failure to fill preference quotas is closely linked to the 
performance level of export sectors and its underlying factors.  As laid out in the 
preceding sections, the overall performance of domestic sectors in Africa has been 
significantly affected, directly and indirectly, by global protectionism and trading 
practices.  In other words, preferences are being undermined by the same distortionary 
effects of global protectionism that they seek to alleviate.  The issues are thus broader 
than price preference and exemption from border protection.  Price-related preference 
erosion should therefore not be treated separately from demand erosion, demand 
substitution, and the possible adjustment in domestic production and consumption 
patterns in African countries that would result from effective global trade liberalization.    
Preferences and Incentives for Long Term Investment in Agriculture 
A major weakness of preferences, from the long term growth point of view, is 
their concessionary character, which makes them less predictable and reliable in the long 
run.  Consequently, they do not create enough incentives for long term investments.     
Furthermore, in the context of smallholder conditions, preferences generate rents that are 
likely to be captured further downstream along the export supply chain, with limited 
incentive for farm-level investment and modernization.  Moreover, in cases where 
exports are subject to taxation, the preference margins may end up constituting fiscal 
transfers from preference-granting to recipient countries, with no assurances that the  
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resources so collected would be invested in sectors that are affected by global 
protectionism.    
Even if broad in coverage and more predictable as in the case of EU’s Everything-
But-Arms (EBA) initiative, preferences would not solve the problem of demand erosion 
and substitution resulting from global protectionism.  More importantly, the problem is 
bound to become more acute, the more countries shift their strategies towards markets in 
preference granting countries in search for ever narrowing export markets.  Only 
effective liberalization of global policies, which is required to remove border protection 
and eliminate domestic support, would solve the problem of demand erosion and demand 
substitution.  Effective liberalization would, however, render preferences unnecessary.   
Moreover, broad liberalization would open the rapidly expanding export markets in 
emerging economies for African exports.  By justifying the perpetuation of global 
protectionism, preferences delay the access to these markets.  In summary, preferences 
need to be coupled with broader liberalization in order to have sustained impact and 
affect the growth process.   Broad and effective liberalization would, however, take away 
the justification for preferences.   From the point of view of African countries, this 
paradox weakens the case of preferences as a strategic objective under multilateral trade 
negotiations.  The argument of preference erosion loses appeal, unless one assumes that 
global trade liberalization is impossible and that demand erosion and substitution as well 
as international trade distortions would persist.   That assumption, albeit currently widely 
shared, should not affect the way we account for the benefits and losses of the current 
system for African countries.   
Is the current Agreement on Agriculture Benefiting or Hurting African Countries? 
As indicated above, the case against preferences and, as will be seen further 
below, Special Differential Treatment (SDT), as key pillars of negotiating positions for 
African countries, is that both are justified only in the case of continued global 
protectionism, which they in turn serve to legitimize.   By definition, preferences imply 
the existence or, in the current case, continuation of protection.  SDT for least developed 
countries, on the other hand, can be seen as the quid pro quo for agreement with a  
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continuation of border protection and domestic support by developed WTO member 
countries.   The numbers shown in Figure 2 above clearly show that preferences have not 
compensated African countries for the harm they suffer due to global protectionism.   On 
the other hand, the available evidence, in the majority of cases, suggests that African 
countries would gain from liberalization of global policies.  While there may be 
disagreement about the size of the gain, there is consensus about the sign of the impact.
4  
In all estimates, the cost of global protectionism, as measured by the simulated changes in 
GDP, value added, or incomes is far greater than the estimated values of preferences 
reported in Figure 2.   
Net food importing countries are often seen as losers because liberalization would 
lead to higher import prices.  These simulations emphasize the effect of increasing world 
market prices on food import cost in these countries.  They often fail to capture the 
dynamic effects of changes in global policy distortions on production and consumption 
patterns in African countries.   The depressing and destabilizing effects of international 
agricultural policies on world market prices have been widely analyzed and documented.  
The same policies have also distorted the structure of world market prices quite 
considerably and increased competition in local and transborder markets in Africa.     
Furthermore, preferences and other concessionary arrangements lack the long term 
predictability and reliability to induce significant investment in agriculture in African and 
other preference receiving countries. Moreover, agricultural protection among OECD 
countries has a strong demonstrative effect among African policy makers, who see them 
as proof of acceptability and effectiveness of interventionist and distortionary policies.   
If the Doha Round were to lead to effective liberalization, the expected changes in 
the structure, levels, and stability of world prices, and of supply conditions in domestic 
markets would most likely have the double effect of stabilizing and raising the average 
levels of profits in Africa’s agricultural sector.   To the extent that higher and more stable 
levels of profit, greater transparency in the international trading environment, and 
                                                 
4  For recent estimates, see Van de Mensbrugge and Beghin (2005); Anderson (2003; 2004); Francois et al 
(2003); William Cline (2004a; 2004b); Ianchovichina et al (2000); and Hoekman et al (2001)  
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improved national policies in African countries translate into higher levels of investment 
and technological innovation, liberalization would accelerate the rate of growth in 
African agriculture in the longer run.  Indeed, studies that incorporate the dynamic effects 
of global protectionism suggest levels of gains from global trade liberalization that are 
several times higher that standard comparative static methods.  For instance, simulations 
by Anderson et al (2005), when treating productivity endogenously, increase the gains 
from trade liberalization in terms of real income among developing countries from US$ 
90 to nearly US$ 700 Billion.  The increase among low income countries would be from 
US$16 to US$ 70 Billion.  In particular, the study indicates, in its comparative static 
version, that the average income gain resulting from global liberalization would be higher 
in Sub-Saharan Africa than in all other regions.  In particular, the estimates indicate 
agricultural output and employment growth rates that are higher or at least comparable to 
rates that are estimated for other regions
5.  
 
                                                 
5 See Anderson et al (2005); Tab. 16; Tab. 12.3; 12.12 & 13 
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IV.  THE DOHA ROUND AND ITS POTENTIAL RISKS FOR AFRICAN 
COUNTRIES 
There are two major risks associated with potential outcomes of the ongoing Doha 
Round negotiations: (i) a lack of effective liberalization, and thus continuation of global 
protectionism, with consequences similar to that of the Uruguay Round, as described 
above; and (ii) Special and Differential Treatment clauses which may perpetuate old, or 
induce new, policy distortions in African countries that are harmful to their domestic 
agricultural sector. 
The Risk of Another Lost Decade for African Agriculture6 
From the point of view of African countries, the real risk is not whether or not an 
agreement will be reached under Doha.  The issue is, rather, whether such an agreement 
will prove to be any more effective than the current AoA at reducing global policy 
distortions and opening up market access for African exports.  There are several reasons 
why Doha may not lead to effective liberalization of agricultural policies in OECD 
countries and thus in the potentially important markets for African exports in emerging 
countries.   Firstly, negotiation modalities for the reduction of domestic support are based 
on final bound as opposed to actual AMS levels, making it unlikely that effective 
reduction would take place, given the level of cuts that would be implied.  Also, given the 
similarity of modalities with the AoA, the chances of decoupling should be limited, if the 
experiences with the current agreement are taken as indicators.  According to Baffes and 
Beghin (2005), “the experience with decoupling agricultural support has been mixed 
while the switch to less distortive support has been uneven across commodities and 
countries. Rules have changed with new decoupling programs added so expectations 
about future policies affect current production decisions. Time limits were not 
implemented and if so, were overruled”.    
On the other hand, proposed modalities for market access foresee tariff reduction 
to be made from bound rates instead of actual, applied levels.  In many cases, the gap 
                                                 
6 The modalities and disciplines cited in this section are described in WTO (2003) and WTO (2004).  
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between the two, or the binding overhang, can be so substantial as to render any tariff 
cuts ineffective. In addition, countries will have the possibility of designating “sensitive 
products” which would enjoy “flexibilities” in terms of tariff reduction.   The elimination 
of tariff quotas is not envisaged, nor is broad reduction of in-quota tariffs on the table.  It 
is not clear at this stage that significant progress will be achieved in terms of eliminating 
tariff peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalation.  In addition, such efforts could be further 
undermined by the introduction of “sensitive products”, which may be primary 
candidates for the application of quotas or subject to high tariffs, tariff peaks and tariff 
escalation.
7   On the export competition front, export subsidies are still defined in terms 
of budgetary outlays and quantity commitments, as under the AoA, and not in terms of 
ad-valorem subsidy equivalents.  The reluctance to negotiate on the basis of ad valorem 
subsidy equivalents would lead to the same loopholes and delays in disciplining export 
competition.  Moreover, as in the other cases, final bound commitments of export subsidy 
volumes and outlays are being used as a basis for further reduction, not actual levels.  
Although the objective is to reduce subsidies to zero by the end of implementation 
period, the modalities involve considerable risk of delaying subsidy cuts for important 
sectors.     
The extent of binding overhang with respect to domestic support and export 
subsidy commitments is illustrated in Figure 3 below.   The left-hand side graph shows 
the extent of export subsidy commitment use for selected products, both in terms of 
volumes and outlays, by all 25 countries that are concerned under AoA.   The share of 
products benefiting from export subsidies is added.   The graph indicates that there 
should be plenty of room to expand export subsidization both in terms of individual 
product coverage as well as aggregate quantities and expenditures.   It can therefore be 
expected that a weak agreement would very likely fail to effectively restore export 
competition. 
                                                 
7 Simulation results in Anderson et al (2005) suggest that application of “sensitive product”  status to 2% 
and 4% of production in developed and developing countries, respectively, would reduce gains from 
reforms by about 80%.  Furthermore, protection measures based CEPII’s MAcMaps tariff measures 
reported in Bouet et al (2001) indicate that elimination of tariff peaks alone would significantly reduce the 
aggregate rate of tariff on agricultural and food products using;  
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Figure 3.  Commitment Use Under AoA 
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The right-hand side graph shows the situation with respect to export subsidies as 
well as domestic support commitment for selected exporters.  Here again, it appears that 
the binding overhang would call for substantial cuts in domestic support and export 
subsidies in order to effect real changes.   However, failure to do so in either case would 
allow countries to compensate cuts in one area by expanding support in another.  Still on 
the export side, proposed rules to discipline food aid call for the provision of non-
emergency food aid in form of untied financial grants.  They would, however, allow in-
kind aid to be provided within the framework of programs or projects operated by 
specialized United Nations food aid agencies or non-governmental humanitarian 
organizations and private charitable bodies.  The latter two groups would be more 
difficult to police and could provide considerable loopholes 
The above examples indicate that there are significant risks of another lost decade 
for African countries in terms of reducing global protectionism and improving access to 
markets.  This conclusion, as well as the preceding discussion, does not ignore the 
difficulties of negotiating agreements nor the complexities involved in arriving at 
mutually acceptable outcomes.  All it does is to stress the risks that these very difficulties 
and complexities, as reflected in the draft modalities and the work program (WTO 2003; 
2004), may well mean that possible outcomes at this Round would not lead to effective  
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liberalization of global agricultural policies over the next 10 years.  If that is the case, 
African countries have would not have much reason to expect great economic benefits 
from the outcomes.   
SDT and its Risks for African Agriculture 
Global negotiations are about detrimental effects of national policies upon trading 
partners and arrangements to reduce or eliminate such effects.  They do not deal with the 
harmful effects of the same policies on individual countries’ own domestic  sectors.   
Agricultural policies in African countries have, however, caused more harm to domestic 
sectors.   Furthermore, Special and Differential Treatment under global trade negotiations 
seeks to alleviate the burden of compliance with global policy changes among African 
and other low income countries.  While doing so, they not only ignore the harmful effects 
of national policies on local agricultural sectors but also may perpetuate or even 
accentuate these effects.   This risk results from the fact that SDT may be easily accepted 
by developed countries because they involve little cost to their economies.  Ironically, 
such SDT may have substantial and detrimental effects on agriculture in the developing 
countries that are requesting them.  They often reflect more the biases of bureaucrats 
requesting them than the real needs of farmers in African countries.   
Several proposed SDT measures are analyzed below which entail the risk of 
encouraging policies that are detrimental to African agriculture.  While warnings have 
been made in the past regarding the risks associated with SDT, there have not been 
efforts to systematically review negotiation modalities with respect to those risks. For 
instance, Oyejide (2002) stresses the potentially counterproductive effects of SDT.  He 
suggests that introduction of multilateral rules governing the granting of derogation.   
However, he sees the risk as limited to derogation with respect to tariff reduction and is 
open to the granting of full derogation with respect to other obligations.   As will be 
shown, SDT risks under Doha go well beyond tariff reduction.   
Current modalities suggest that proposed disciplines outlawing new export 
prohibitions, restrictions, or taxes on foodstuffs shall not be applicable to developing  
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countries (WTO 2003; para 39 and 40).  It is difficult to see how this derogation can be 
beneficial to the agricultural sector.  If anything, it would legitimate and perpetuate a 
practice that has done and continues to do quite significant harm to the agricultural sector 
in African and other developing countries.  Under export competition, developing 
countries can, under certain conditions, request an exporting country to provide more 
generous export financing terms than permissible under the proposed new rules seeking 
to discipline export financing.  This measure is open to abuse given that both exporting 
countries and importing countries, willing to satisfy interests of trader groups, would 
have incentives to use it.   Similarly, SDT under export finance rules would allow 
developing countries to use longer maximum repayment terms and longer installment 
periods for principal and interest repayments when providing export finance. While few 
African countries would make use of this measure, it would weaken the agreement by 
opening the door for continued subsidization of exports into Africa by exporting 
developing countries, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
Proposed SDT measures under Art. 6.2 would allow countries to provide input 
subsidies.  The benefit to farmers from such derogation is obvious.  However, the 
absence of discipline as to under which conditions and in which form such subsidies can 
be provided could lead to government interference in input distribution and output 
marketing sectors.  Similarly, SDT related to provision of subsidies for concessional 
loans through established credit institutions for the establishment of credit cooperatives 
entail the risk of  interference with lending policies and practices and hence viability of 
the banking sector.  Also, SDT targeting assistance for the establishment and operation of 
cooperatives, risk management, and compliance with SPS should be beneficial.  It may, 
however, lead to intervention in the marketing system to control prices, crop movement, 
or other sales strategies.   
Under export competition, proposed rules disciplining State Trading Enterprises 
(STE) would exempt developing countries from prohibition of STE to restrict the right of 
any interested entity to export agricultural products or purchase such good for export.  
Further, the Doha Work Program (WTO. 2004) postulates that “STEs in developing  
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country Members which enjoy special privileges to preserve domestic consumer price 
stability and to ensure food security will receive special consideration for maintaining 
monopoly status (Annex A; para 25).  Another proposed rule that would be applicable to 
all WTO members would ensure that STE do not export at a price that is less than the 
price paid to domestic producers.  While such a rule would protect foreign suppliers from 
dumping, the exemption being granted to developing countries under the above SDT 
measure would, on the other hand, allow STE in these countries to suppress export 
demand and thus lower prices paid to local farmers.  While it is difficult to see how such 
derogation could benefit the agricultural sector in African countries, its risks for the 
sector are enormous and obvious.   
In all the above cases, SDT should spell out certain principles governing their 
application.  One may contend that global negotiations are not the place to address 
strictly self-inflicted harm and that it is the responsibility of SDT using countries to use 
them wisely and to the benefit of their farming sector.  History has taught us that this is 
not always the case, certainly not in many African and developing countries.  On the 
other hand, it can be argued that SDT measures resulting from global negotiations 
provide some sense of global legality to distortionary practices in the sense that they can 
be now seen as WTO compliant.  When practices are being cemented and legitimized in 
international agreements, it is certainly justified to expect that such agreements provide 
safeguards against abuse of these practices.  For instance, disciplines could be introduced 
in connection with the above SDT which would ensure that subsidies are applied at farm 
level and without interference with the pricing and distribution of inputs by private sector 
operators.  SDT dealing with market risk, compliance with norms, and support to 
cooperatives should include provisions to avoid their leading to price controls and other 
forms of restrictions to operations by private traders.    
At a more general level, SDT implies delayed reform by African and other 
developing countries.  As shown by most studies, a significant share of the potential 
benefits from global trade reform would come from changes in policies in developing 
countries.  Anderson et al (2005), for instance, conclude that “reform by developing  
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countries is nearly as important in terms of economic welfare gains to the South as 
reform by high-income countries.”  Furthermore, if liberalization were to follow the 
tiered formula proposal in the current modalities, developed countries would reap 90% of 
the gains from reforms.  If that is the case, then the cost and risks of SDT would 
significantly reduce its value to African and other developing countries. 
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V.  KEY ELEMENTS OF SUCCESSFUL DOHA OUTCOMES FOR AFRICAN 
COUNTRIES 
One often reads in the literature that reform of policies in OECD countries is 
political unfeasible.  Yet, OECD leaders are at the forefront of trade negotiations efforts.  
Either they believe that changes are possible or they are convinced that the current 
situation is increasingly politically unacceptable and thus have to display a willingness to 
act.  Whatever the case, African countries cannot and should not buy into that argument.  
They have the most to lose under a continuation of global protectionism.  Their efforts to 
achieve sustainable growth would be significantly hampered.  On the other hand, OECD 
countries do have choices.  They have the possibility to choose instruments that help 
them achieve their goals in the agricultural sector but do not harm African economies.  
The difficulty for African countries is that global negotiations are based on a philosophy 
that places the emphasis on give and take, a mutual removal of harms caused by 
economic policies.  If a party is being hurt by the policies of another but it is not in a 
position to remove some harm being caused by its own economic policies on the latter, 
because such harm is limited or does not exist, such as in the case of African countries, 
then it becomes difficult, if not impossible, for the former party to obtain satisfaction.   
So far, trade negotiations have been effective in dealing with mutual harms.     
They have not been able to deal with a situation where the harm is in one direction and 
the economy that is being harmed has no economic means of pressure on the perpetrating 
country.  African countries find themselves in this situation with respect to global 
protectionism.  Considerable pressure has been exerted on developed countries at the 
beginning of the Doha Round to shift the negotiating philosophy to deal with 
unidirectional or absolute harm, when the policies of a given country are causing 
considerable harm to another, which is not in a position either to retaliate or to offer some 
type of economic reprieve.   The strategy here has been to move towards a so-called 
development round.  Looked at careful, the rationale underlying the “development round” 
concept is one that is based on the unlikelihood or impossibility of African policies to 
cause harm.   The underlying argument is that they have not caused harm now, and hence  
  25
do not have to be targeted for reform in the negotiations; they cannot cause harm in the 
future, and thus should be exempted from future agreements trough SDT and other types 
of derogation.    
As pointed out earlier, the consequence of this strategy is to legitimize the 
perpetuation of global protectionism from the point of view of African countries and their 
advocates.   It has, however, been quite helpful is taking the negotiations away from the 
offer and counter-offer paradigm.   In order to be really helpful to African countries, the 
strategy should be expanded to recognize the right of African economies to equal 
opportunity to compete.  Two decades of bilateral and multilateral conditionalities and 
reforms to rid their economies of policy distortions give them the right to expect removal 
of distortions and policy interventions, in particular, in the countries which have 
supported and helped enforce these conditionalities.  African countries also have the right 
to expect the discourse about globalization and their integration into the world economy 
to be reflected in the rules and principles governing global trade and economic 
relationships between countries.   A basic principle is that economic relationships and 
exchange between countries be based on the market mechanism.   African countries have 
the right to demand that these principles be also extended and fully applied to agricultural 
trade.   Whether or not they succeed in obtaining satisfaction during the Doha or 
subsequent rounds should not change this position.  More importantly, they should have 
no interest in entering into agreements that would keep them away rather moving them 
closer to that outcome. 
Furthermore, the efforts by OECD countries and multilateral organizations to 
mobilize the world in eliminating poverty in African and other developing countries 
should dictate greater efforts towards effective liberalization of global agricultural 
markets.   A continuation of global protectionism would starkly reduce the capacity of 
many African countries to achieve faster and broad-based growth.  It would also reduce 
returns to official development assistance (ODA) and other efforts to spur growth in these 
countries.   Vast segments of the population in these countries would continue to suffer 
the vagaries of international markets resulting from global protectionism.     
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Figure 4 below illustrates the vulnerability of the poorest segments of the 
population in Africa to developments in international agricultural markets.   Contrary to 
what many may think, many poor households in Africa depend on exports crops for their 
livelihood, as indicated by the share of cotton in the incomes of poor rural households.  In 
the present case, the poorest 40-percent among rural households derive about 20 percent 
of their income from cotton against less than 15 percent among the richest 20-percent of 
households.  The right-hand side graph shows the impact of falling world market prices 
on poverty among rural households is shown in the right-hand side graph.  A 1.0 percent 
decline in the world market price of cotton translates to a -0.5 percent decline in average 
incomes.  It raises the poverty incidence (P0), or the number of households below the 
poverty line, by 1.5 percent.  It increases the poverty gap (P1), or the difference between 
the average income of poor households and the poverty line, by nearly 2 percent.  It 
makes the poorest among the poorest poorer by increasing the poverty depth (P3) by 
3.5%.    
Figure 4.  World Markets and Poverty in Africa 
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Based on the arguments laid out above, successful negotiations from the point of 
view of Africa’s long term development interest should include: (i) effective decoupling 
of domestic support measures; (ii) full elimination of export subsidies; (iii) removal of 
border protection, including in by emerging and middle income countries; (iii) pursuit of 
the reform agenda in African countries; and (iv) disciplined SDT targeted as much as  
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possible to compliance assistance.  Preferences and untargeted SDT would just serve to 
legitimize global protectionism and retard global liberalization efforts.  Even, in this case, 
it is unlikely that agreements would be reached for all developed counties to provide 
EBA-style duty- and quota-free access for imports from African countries, as is timidly 
proposed in the current modalities.  Moreover, such arrangements would need to be made 
binding to some extent to make some difference to long term investment and growth.  
Such an option is currently not on the table.  Rather, countries are being asked to consider 
EBA-style preferences on a voluntary and autonomous basis.  Still, EBA-style 
preferences by developed countries would not open access to the faster growing markets 
in emerging countries to African exports.   As illustrated in Bouet et al (2001), market 
access measured by MAcMaps’ aggregate measure of protection, which converts and 
sums up the ad-valorem equivalents of various instruments of protection, is also highly 
restricted among emerging and other developing economies.  The numbers that are 
reported for a sample of developing countries including Brazil, China, and Morocco show 
overall food and agricultural protection and tariff peaks levels that are similar to or higher 
than the levels observed in the US, EU, or Japan.  The ranking of countries by degrees of 
overall protection places these countries before the US, EU, and Japan. 
Africa would still need some type of SDT in the case of full liberalization but it 
would focus on compliance assistance rather than preferences and derogation.  If SDT 
measures should involve derogation, they would have to be disciplined and rules defined 
for their applicability in cases where there is substantial risk of abuse.   African 
governments would have to significantly improve governance and economic 
management.  They would have to invest in business skills development, quality 
management systems, research, and infrastructure.   Although they will need assistance 
for a while to come, there is quite a bit that African countries can do on their own in these 
areas.   For instance, the types of “development interventions” that Dorward et al have 
discussed in their paper could apply here,   But not as substitutes to global trade 
liberalization.  Rather, they could be considered as accompanying measures.  All three  
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types of interventions, supply chain coordination, pump-priming of investments, and 
threshold shifting, can be carried out through public-partnership programs.   
More problematic would be proposals for African countries to resort to protection, 
as implied partly under the threshold-shifting intervention option.   Although one can try 
to make a historic case for protection, as in the chapter by N. Koning, there is enough 
evidence in the literature to show that the price instrument is too costly in terms of its 
intersectoral and economy-wide ramifications.   Protection may have worked historically, 
perhaps, because it was an answer to slow and long term changes in comparative 
advantages.   It would be a poor answer to relative cost changes that result from foreign 
production and export subsidies that can be varied at will and overnight to wipe out any 
benefit from protection by African countries.  Moreover, protection in African countries 
in the context of continued global protectionism would fail for the simple reason that 
African countries could not possibly outdo OECD countries when it comes matters to 
protection.  And even if they could, the cost and level of required protection among 
African countries would be lower with lower levels of global protectionism.  Protection 
by African countries can therefore not be seen as an alternative to global trade 
liberalization. 
Also, the research community will have to be significantly more relevant and 
helpful to African governments as they strive to cope with the effects of globalization and 
international protectionism.  Rather than investigating Africa-wide implications of global 
trade liberalization, which is helpful in highlighting the overall cost of protectionism, or 
assuming away the capacity of African countries to adjust positively to changes in the 
global trading environment in the case of liberalization, the research community could be 
looking at investment and policy options that would help individual African governments 
craft strategies to gain from such liberalization.  There is no Africa-wide government that 
can apply lessons and recommendations that are drawn from studies where African 
countries are lumped together in an artificial construct.  Also, research that inherently 
assumes that African governments would respond to liberalization with little or no 
changes in strategies should be neither helpful nor relevant.  We know the implications of  
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the status quo and they are disastrous for African development, as indicated by the 
preceding discussion.  The real issue is how to make effective liberalization beneficial for 
African countries, a question that can only be answered by country level research which 
targets necessary investment and policy adjustment options. 
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VI. CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
African countries are more vulnerable to global protectionism in agriculture than 
any other region of the world, due to characteristics inherent to their economies.  They 
have been affected negatively by the combination of domestic subsidies, border 
protection, unfair export competition, and distortions in global markets.  Although 
preferential trading arrangements were introduced to mitigate some the effects of global 
protectionism on African counties, they turn out to be less beneficial than expected.  In 
the aftermath of the Uruguay Round and in particular during the Doha Round, African 
countries and their supporters have placed substantial emphasis on Special Differential 
Treatment and other types of derogation to global trading agreements.   While the value 
of preferences has been shown to be limited, SDT can involve significant risks and be 
open to abuse.  Perhaps African countries have given up the hope that global 
protectionism can be reformed.  Ironically, by positioning themselves for preferences and 
SDT, they help perpetuate and legitimize international protectionist policies.   
Most studies conclude that African countries would gain from effective global 
trade liberalization.  These gains are higher when long term productivity adjustments are 
taken into consideration.   By failing to effectively reform international protectionist 
policies, global trade negotiations have not responded to the real needs of the African 
economies.   The philosophy of offer and counter-offer characterizing these negotiations 
are not geared towards addressing situations where there is absolute and not relative or 
mutual harm, that is a situation where the harm is unidirectional and the party being hurt 
is not in a position to offer some type of economic reprieve as an incentive for 
concessions from the party perpetrating the harm.   Only when negotiations are ready to 
deal with absolute harm will they be able to effectively and satisfactorily address the real 
concerns of African countries.  The introduction of food security and development 
objetives into the Doha Round are steps in the right direction.   The next step would be to 
reduce the emphasis on preferences and untargeted and undisciplined SDT in seeking to 
address these objectives under the framework of global trade agreements.     
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Elimination of the detrimental impact of global protectionism on economic 
growth and development prospects among African countries would require effective 
liberalization of global agricultural policies.   This should be the objective of African 
countries under international trade negotiations.  Any SDT to be sought and granted 
under such negotiations should be targeted to compliance facilitation and disciplined in 
order to avoid possible abuse.  The time for such dramatic changes may not have come 
yet.  The Doha agenda and the current modalities are too timid to lead to any significant 
reduction in actual support, subsidies, and access barriers during this round.  African 
countries will have to look beyond Doha, accept the reality of another lost decade, and 
use the coming years to appropriately prepare themselves for maximum success during 
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